Anti-SLAPP Appeals
California's anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, provides important protections for defendants being sued for certain protected free speech or petitioning activities. Under this statute, a defendant can move to strike the plaintiff's complaint. To succeed, the defendant must show its actions fell within one of the protected categories. If the defendant does so, the plaintiff must then show a likelihood of prevailing in the litigation. An order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion is appealable. Despite the apparent simplicity of this motion, numerous complex issues often arise, and the California Supreme Court has taken numerous appeals in the past 25 years to try to clarify the law. Nonetheless, this statute remains an important tool to protect against lawsuits arising out of protected First Amendment activities.
Potter v. Barenholtz (B338369) (2026)
California Court of Appeal
Second Appellate District, Division Four
Bruce represented the successor trustee of a family trust. The trust had been established by a mother who lived in a condominium with her developmentally disabled son. The trust's sole asset was the condominium and the beneficiaries were her daughter and the son's special needs trust. After the mother's death, the daughter designated Bruce's client as successor trustee. The son lived alone in the condominium and was unable to care for himself and the condominium. The unit was littered with trash, suffered water damage from leaks, and was overrun with cockroaches, mold, and noxious odors. Foreclosure notices were filed against the property after the son stopped paying the mortgage and homeowners' association fees. Bruce's client tried for years to help the son move to a more appropriate living situation, but the son refused. When the son refused entry for necessary repairs, the trustee, left with no other realistic choice, filed an unlawful detainer action to remove the son from the condominium. He obtained a default judgment and eventually obtained a writ of possession and evicted the son. He had social workers on site during the eviction, but the son again refused all help.
The son obtained counsel after the eviction and successfully moved to vacate the default judgment, but not the writ of execution, on the ground that the trustee failed to inform the unlawful detainer court that the son was developmentally disabled. The son then sue the trustee for numerous tort claims arising out of the eviction and the trustees refusal to return possession of the condominium to the son. The trustee filed an anti-SLAPP motion arguing the claims arose from protected petitioning activity and were barred by the litigation privilege. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded the son attorneys' fees on the ground that the motion was frivolous. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that son's claims arose out of the trustee's petitioning and the litigation privilege barred the derivative tort claims even when based on allegations of extrinsic fraud. While extrinsic fraud may support an equitable action to set aside a judgment, the court joined a long line of appellate authority holding it does not support a separate tort action for damages. Because the motion had merit as to these tort claims, it was not frivolous, and the court also reversed the sanctions award.
OpinionMasjedi v. Valdez (B340847) (2025)
California Court of Appeal
Second Appellate District, Division One
Bruce represented an elderly woman who had been harassed by her former tenant after she successfully evicted him. The former tenant sued her, and she filed a cross-complaint for elder abuse and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The former tenant then filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court denied his motion and awarded Bruce's client sanctions for the former tenant's frivolous motion. He then appealed. The Court of Appeal dismissed part of the appeal, affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion, and awarded Bruce's client additional sanctions for the former tenant's frivolous appeal.
OpinionFenton v. Liner Yankelevitz (B196714) (2008)
California Court of Appeal
Second Appellate District, Division One
Bruce represented a former client of a law firm in a breach of fiduciary duty action against the law firm. Years after the initial representation, the law firm represented the opposing party in a related case. Bruce’s client alleged that the firm’s representation of the new client violated its duty of loyalty and confidentiality. The firm filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the claims arose from protected litigation conduct. The trial court denied the motion, and the firm appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order in favor of Bruce's client. It held undertaking the conflicting representation, not the firm’s in-court statements, was the basis of the complaint, and that the protected conduct was merely incidental.
OpinionGall v. King & Hanagami (B174410) (2005)
California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 1
Bruce represented the respondents—attorneys and a law firm—who were sued for fraud and misrepresentation during settlement negotiations. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants concealed certain information during these discussions that could affect certain benefits. The trial court struck the complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that the statements occurred during settlement discussions and were absolutely privileged.
Opinion