Tufeld Corp. v. Beverly Hills Gateway L.P. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 12 (B314862)

California Court of Appeal

Second Appellate District, Division Five

A partial victory. The case involved a 116-year extension of a ground lease for a building in Beverly Hills. The problem is that Civil Code section 718 prohibits leases for more than 99 years. The Court of Appeal agreed with Bruce that the lease term was void. However, it disagreed on several other issues.

Case Note

This appeal involved a deep dive into legislative history of Civil Code, section 718. This statute was passed as part of the 1872 California Civil Code. That body of law was based on 1851 California statutes and the New York 1865 Civil Code, and that statute was based on provisions in New York's 1846 Constitution. Those were imposed based on the "anti-rent wars" in some eastern New York counties, which arose out of odd and restrictive land leases on estates granted by both the King of Holland and Kings of England in the 17th and early 18th century. These leases would have been illegal under the Qui Emptores act, passed in England in 1290. However, this statute act was held inapplicable to pre-revolutionary war land grants. The New York constitutional provisions in the 1840s were designed to remedy this problem (although ultimately did not). Both sides discussed this long and extensive legislative history in detail, and this was the only time Bruce has had to trace legislative history this far back.

Ambartsumyan v. Atalla et al. (D074704) (2019)

California Court of Appeal

Fourth Appellate District, Division One

Bruce represented the lessors in a commercial lease dispute involving a truck stop and underground fuel tanks. The lessee sued for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing after the lessors refused to allow a proposed fuel conversion from diesel to gasoline. At trial, the jury found in favor of the lessee and awarded damages, and the trial court awarded substantial attorney’s fees. On appeal, Bruce successfully argued that the breach of contract finding was unsupported by the lease terms (although was unsuccessful on the breach of the implied covenant claim). The Court of Appeal reversed the breach of contract judgment and remanded for a new trial on damages related solely to the implied covenant claim, with instructions to reconsider prevailing party status.

Gomez v. Cano et al. (G054394) (2018)

California Court of Appeal

Fourth Appellate District, Division Three

Bruce represented the defendants on appal, after a bench trial arising from a failed business venture. The trial court found in favor of Bruce’s clients on all causes of action. On appeal, the plaintiff—appearing in pro per—raised only a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the Court of Appeal rejected as inapplicable to civil litigation. The judgment was affirmed in full.

Case Note

Many cases involving a pro per appellant involve clearly meritless claims. The goal on appeal is not just to win, but to do so efficiently without incurring large attorney’s fees. Bruce did so here.

Beck v. Meislin (G052881) (2017)

California Court of Appeal

Fourth Appellate District, Division Three

Bruce represented the respondent on appeal in a fee dispute between an attorney and his former client. The attorney sued to enforce a contingent fee agreement after the client conditioned her acceptance of a settlement on receiving a specific amount in net proceeds. The trial court found that the attorney had accepted the client’s condition by conveying the settlement and was bound by it. On appeal, Bruce successfully defended the judgment against multiple attacks by the attorney. The Court of Appeal affirming the judgment, clarified that the client has the right to pre-judgment interest, and ultimately reported the attorney to the bar for his unethical conduct.

Case Note

This case illustrates the importance an independent evaluation of a case on appeal. Opposing counsel was a lawyer representing himself who had taken a series of aggressive and unethical actions against his former client. The trial court found against him. I would presume that any reasonable appellate lawyer would have counseled him not to appeal and simply to pay the amount owed. Not only did the lawyer lose on appeal and get reported to the state bar, but after the appeal was over, the trial court awarded attorneys’ fee to Bruce’s client for Bruce’s work on the appeal and post-appeal motion for attorney’s fees. See here.

G.H. Development Corp. et al. v. Ozell (B210539) (2010)

California Court of Appeal

Second Appellate District, Division Four

Bruce represented the successful respondent, an attorney sued for breach of fiduciary duty in a complex real estate dispute involving multiple entities. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the operative complaint failed to allege any fiduciary duty owed by the attorney to the plaintiff entities. On appeal, after a preliminary motion to strike improper parts of the appellant's opening brief (discussed here), Bruce successfully defended the dismissal by showing the attorney did not have an attorney-client relationship with any of the business entities and thus owed them no fiduciary duties. The Court of Appeal also concluded the plaintiffs had numerous opportunities to amend their complaint and failed to cure this defect.

Case Note

The appellants’ opening brief in this case raised numerous claims not covered by the notice of appeal or an appealable judgment or order. Rather than arguing against all these claims in the respondent’s brief, Bruce first filed a motion to strike portions of the opening brief. The Court of Appeal granted this motion, leaving fewer claims to address in the respondent’s brief. This simplified the appeal and reduced the cost to the client.

Zweig v. Kwon (B153064) (2003)

California Court of Appeal

Second Appellate District, Division Three

Bruce represented a former client of two attorneys seeking to enforce an oral contingency agreement. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment for Bruce’s client, holding that the attorneys failed to comply with Business and Professions Code § 6147, which requires contingency fee agreements to be in writing. Because the agreement was voidable, the attorneys were entitled only to a reasonable fee based on quantum meruit. The court rejected their argument that “reasonable” meant 40–50% of the recovery, and upheld the trial court’s finding that they had already been paid sufficiently.

This case followed Bruce's prior successful representation of the client in an appeal of the underlying case, discussed here.

Case Note

Although it should go without saying, this case illustrates the importance to both lawyers and clients of having a written fee agreement.